In a rock-paper-scissors variant the winner scores if the win came with paper, if it came with rock and if it came with scissors; the loser scores the negative of the same amount, and a tie scores . What mixed strategy should a player adopt, and what is the value of the game?
Write down the payoff matrix. Let the row player choose rock, paper or scissors with probabilities , , , where and all are non-negative. Paper beats rock (), rock beats scissors (), scissors beats paper (), and each loss is the negative. The game is zero-sum and symmetric — both players face the same matrix — which already tells us its value must be .
Compute the row player's expected payoff against each pure reply.
Impose the equalising condition. At a mixed equilibrium the opponent must be indifferent between all three replies, otherwise they would switch to the best one and exploit us. So
together with . This "make the opponent indifferent" principle is the entire method.
Solve the linear system. From we get . Substituting into :
From we get ; with this becomes , so and , hence
Read off the value and verify. Substituting into any of the three expressions, . Checking all three: ✓, ✓, ✓, and ✓. The value confirms the symmetry argument from step 1.
Interpret the weights. Scissors is played most often () even though winning with it scores only — because scissors is the counter to paper, the opponent's most rewarding weapon, and it must be discouraged. Paper, the highest-scoring winner, is played least (). In equalising games the probability of a move tracks how badly the opponent's best option must be suppressed, not how much that move itself pays.
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